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Abstract 
This paper investigated the relationship between board characteristics 
and corporate performance of firms in Palestine. The degree to which the 
board is effective in performing its duties and tasks depends on several 
factors manifested by certain characteristics. Particularly, this research 
examined the impact of CEO duality, board size, board independence, 
board gender diversity, board academic background, and frequency of 
board meetings on the level of corporate performance. The sample 
encompassed all firms listed in the Palestine Stock Exchange (PSE) with 
available data for the years 2012 to 2014 with total 141 firm-year 
observations. The data was manually collected from the audited annual 
reports downloaded from PSE website. Generalized least square estimators 
were obtained for the multiple-linear relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance. The results indicate that corporate 
performance of Palestinian listed firms is positively related to board 
duality, board gender diversity, and number of board meetings. 
Meanwhile, board size, board independence and board academic 
background seem to negatively affect performance. The results are 
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consistent with the stewardship theory where the board plays a supportive 
role by empowering executives leading to, potentially, higher 
performance. In this context decisions are executed faster, the ambiguity 
between the processes and the objectives of the firm is reduced and 
performance is enhanced. Our results have an implication to any future 
corporate governance code setting. The stewardship theory not the agency 
theory should guide the lawmakers in constructing any new legislation 
related to corporate governance. 




تهدف هذه الدراسة الى اختبار العالقة بين خصائص مجلس االدارة وبين اداء الشركات في 
فلسطين، ان كفاءة مجلس االدارة في اداء مهامه تعتمد على العديد من العوامل ومنها خصائص 
مجلس االدارة، وقد حقق هذا البحث هدفه من خالل اختبار أثر العوامل التالية على أداء الشركة: 
عدد )واجية الدور الذي يمارسه رئيس مجلس االدارة بحيث يكون هو المدير العام ايضا، حجم ازد
اعضاء( مجلس االدارة، استقاللية اعضاء مجلس االدارة، التنوع في مجلس االدارة، الخلفية 
االكاديمية ألعضاء مجلس االدارة، وعدد االجتماعات التي يعقدها المجلس خالل العام، الختبار 
لكافة الشركات  2014وحتى  2012مقطعية من سنة -العالقات السابقة تم استخدام بيانات زمنية
المدرجة في بورصة فلسطين والتي تتوافر البيانات المطلوبة لها خالل تلك الفترة، كافة البيانات 
على المستخدمة تم الحصول عليها يدويا من التقارير السنوية المدققة للشركات كما هي متوفرة 
موقع سوق فلسطين لالوراق المالية، تم تقدير معامالت االنحدار باستخدام طريقة المربعات 
ظهرت النتائج ان أداء الشركات الفلسطينية يتأثر سلبا بحجم مجلس (، وقد أGLS) الصغرى العامة
 االدارة وباستقاللية أعضائه وبعدد حملة الدكتوراة فيه، ولكن ظهر وجود عالقة موجبة بين
مما يتوافق مع نظرية االشراف  ،المدير العام وبين األداءوازدواجية دور رئيس مجلس االدارة 
التي تفسر حقيقة انه عندما يكون رئيس مجلس االدارة هو نفسه المدير العام فإن القرارات ستنفذ 
ا بشكل اسرع، والغموض في العمليات واالهداف للشركة ستكون اقل، واألداء سيكون افضل، كم
اظهرت النتائج عالقة ايجابية قوية بين نسبة النساء في عضوية مجلس االدارة وأداء الشركة، 
أخيرا فإن عدد االجتماعات التي يعقدها مجلس االدارة كان له اثر ايجابي ايضا على اداء الشركة، 
ه في فلسطين وتتالءم النتائج بشكل عام مع نظرية االشراف مما يعني ان اي قانون للحوكمة يتم تبني
 .يجب ان يأخذ ذلك بعين االعتبار
 حوكمة الشركات، خصائص مجلس االدارة، الشركات الفلسطينية  الكلمات المفتاحية:
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Introduction 
Corporate governance has been a focus of enormous economic studies. 
The spreading of global financial crises and scandals has brought to light 
corporate governance concerns both in developed and developing 
countries. Regulators, policy makers, financial institutions, investors and 
other stakeholders became more aware of the firm’s need to have strong 
and sound corporate governance framework which provide a legal 
platform and guidelines that secure the interests of investors and improve 
corporate performance (Ponnu, 2008).    
Corporate governance practices are therefore intended to suggest 
solutions to the problems allied with the split-up between ownership and 
management of the organization. Good corporate governance intends to 
protect the overall interests of stockholders and supports the level of trust 
for investors. Weak and unsophisticated corporate governance does not 
lead merely to corporate underperformance and unattractive investment 
environment, but also leads to macroeconomic crises (Johnson et al., 
2000). The growing importance of corporate governance was pursuit by 
the integration and deregulation of capital markets, the wave of 
privatization, the reforming of pension funds and private savings, the 
takeover waves, and the world-wild corporate scandals (Becht et al., 
2002). 
Good corporate governance manifests itself in the effectiveness of the 
board of directors and the management of the corporation. The board of 
directors is responsible for mitigating self-interest activities as well as 
reducing losses caused by sub-optimal decisions by executives (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The board effectiveness remains 
hard to understand and define, as there is major debate about the roles and 
tasks that should be assigned to the board. The board effectiveness 
dimensions include searching the environment for threats and 
opportunities provide guidance and feedback to the CEO; and, draw out a 
network of contacts and sources of knowledge to strengthen firm 
performance (Lawler et al., 2002). This is a broader definition than the 
traditional board effectiveness in monitoring and controlling managers. In 
addition, board responsibilities lie in directing the CEO and top 
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management on strategic issues, and facilitating the attainment of 
resources important for the firm’s success, as well as mitigating agency 
costs (Johnson et al., 1996). 
The degree to which the board would be effective in performing its 
duties and tasks depends on several factors, which may be made up of 
particular board characteristics like board duality, CEO duality, board size, 
board diversity, and board skills among others (Peng et al., 2007; Daily & 
Dalton, 1997; Silva et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2003). 
Palestine is a small economy but increasingly adopting the concepts 
of good corporate governance. There is increased interest in promoting 
corporate governance guidelines by governmental institutions, civil 
society organizations, and business sectors because of the increased 
awareness about the importance of governance in creating an attractive 
investment environment that is able to attract domestic and external 
investments, therefore, achieving higher rates of economic growth, 
decreasing unemployment, poverty and external support dependency 
(Abdelkarim, 2016; Hassan, Naser & Hijazi, 2016). 
In spite of the growing awareness of the importance of corporate 
governance, little empirical research exists to determine the relationship 
between board characteristics and corporate performance of firms in 
Palestine with few studies discussed the relationship between governance 
and performance (Abdelkarim, 2016; Abdelkarim & Alawneh, 2009; 
Hassan, Naser & Hijazi, 2016). A study of board-performance association 
in Palestine is crucial to add to our knowledge about this relationship from 
a unique, small and relatively closed economy of Palestine. What 
characteristics make one board relatively more effective than other boards? 
This research was set to answer this question by examining the impact of 
CEO duality, board size, board independence, board diversity, board skills 
and frequency of board meetings on the level of corporate performance. 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we 
reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature. In Section 3, we 
developed the hypotheses. In Section 4, the data and methodology are 
presented. In Section 5, the results are discussed and Section 6 concluded. 
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Literature Review  
From a theoretical point of view, corporate governance is often 
analyzed using agency theory, stewardship theory, resource-dependence 
theory, and stakeholder theory. In agency theory the goal of the agent is 
different from that of the principals, and they may conflict (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) hence, board tends to exercise strict control, supervision, 
and monitoring on the performance of the agent in order to protect the 
interests of the principals (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In stewardship 
theory, executives of a company are stewards of the owners, and both 
groups share common goals (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). The 
board should play a supportive role by empowering executives and, in turn, 
increase the potential for higher performance (Shen, 2003). Resource-
dependence theory argues that a board exists as a provider of resources to 
executives in order to help them achieve organizational goals (Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). Resource-dependence theory recommends 
interventions by the board while advocating for strong financial, human, 
and intangible supports to the executives. Finally, stakeholder theory 
assumes that shareholders are not the only group with a stake in a firm. 
Others can be affected by the success or failure of the firm. Therefore, 
managers have special obligations to ensure that all stakeholders (not just 
the shareholders) receive a fair return from their stake in the company 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In this context, the board has a 
responsibility to be the guardian of the interests of all stakeholders by 
ensuring that corporate or organizational practices take into account the 
principles of sustainability for surrounding communities. 
Empirical evidence is voluminous but the results are mixed. (Beiner et 
al., 2006) discussed whether ‘good’ corporate governance has a positive 
impact on firm valuation of Swiss firms and found supports to the 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between firm-specific corporate 
governance index and Tobin’s Q. (Arora & Bodhanwala, 2018) examine 
the relationship between a corporate governance index and firm 
performance in India. The study reveals significant positive relationship 
between governance and firm performance. (Johl, Kaur, & Cooper, 2015) 
study the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance. 
5
Abdeljawad and Masri: Board Characteristics and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Pa
Published by Arab Journals Platform, 2020
ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  750 "Board Characteristics and Corporate Performance:  .....” 
An - Najah Univ. J. Res. (Humanities). Vol. 34(4), 2020 ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  
The findings suggest that larger board size, less frequent board meetings 
and a higher percentage of board members with accounting expertise have 
a positive implication on firm performance. However, board independence 
does not affect firm performance according to this study. 
Arslan, Karan, and Eksi (2010) analyzed the impact of board structure 
attributes on accounting and stock market performance of firms in Turkey 
in both general and crisis periods. They found that duality of CEO and the 
chairman of the board has no impact on corporate performance in general 
period although it has negative impact during the crisis period. Moreover, 
board independence is found to have no effect on accounting performance, 
yet the stock market perceives board independence positively, both in 
general and in the crisis periods. Finally, board size has a positive impact, 
both on the accounting and on the stock market performance of firms, yet 
the impact reverts to negative during the crisis period.  
Mishra and Kapil (2018) explored the relationship of board 
characteristics and firm performance for Indian companies. Market-based 
measure (Tobin’s Q) and accounting-based measure (return on asset) have 
been employed for measuring firm performance. Findings indicate that 
there is significant positive association between board size, board 
independence, number of board meetings, and separation of CEO and 
chairman of the board from one side and firm performance from the other. 
Overburdened directors affect firm performance adversely. Findings also 
suggest that the governance-performance relationship is also dependent 
upon the type of performance measures used in the study whether 
accounting or market measures. Zhou, Owusu-Ansah, and Maggina (2018) 
investigated whether the characteristics of board of directors and audit 
committees are associated with firm performance in the Athens Stock 
Exchange and find that firms having large-sized boards performed better, 
but firms having more independent board members performed poorly. 
Moreover, firms with small-sized boards and those with boards having 
more independent members are more likely to form audit committees, but 
no association between audit committee characteristics and firm 
performance. These findings suggest that boards of Greek firms take more 
active role in advising than monitoring. Petchsakulwong and Jansakul 
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(2017) investigated the impact of board of directors' characteristics on the 
profitability ratio of Thai public non-life insurers measured by return on 
total assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on net written 
premiums (RNP). The findings revealed positive relationship between 
board size and the profitability ratio. On the contrary, board meeting 
frequency was negatively related with ROA and RNP. In addition, firm 
size was negatively related with the profitability ratio. 
In Palestine, a national committee for corporate governance has issued 
the first Corporate Governance Code in 2009. Though the code lacks the 
enforceability, most firms adopted it by the encouragement of the stock 
exchange and the Capital Market Authority. For banks, the Palestine 
Monetary Authority has also issued the Corporate Governance Guide for 
Banks in Palestine in 2014. How these codes affect the performance of 
firms is largely unknown. Only few papers addressed the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance in Palestine. Abdelkarim 
and Alawneh (2009) investigated the relationship between ownership 
concentration, as a proxy for governance, and firm performance as 
measured by Tobin’s Q on a sample of 16 Palestinian companies from 
2003 to 2006 and found that the two variables are negatively related. 
Abdelkarim and Ijbara (2010) examined the Palestinian non-banking 
listed-firms compliance to corporate governance using self-administered 
questionnaire survey. They do not find satisfactory compliance of 
Palestinian firms with the corporate governance best practices with respect 
to board composition and independence. They explain this non-
compliance by the non-enforceability of the corporate governance code, 
the outdated companies’ law, which is issued in 1963 and to the family 
ownership dominance over corporations. Abdelkarim (2016) found no 
relationship between firm performance and the degree of governance 
compliance using a sample of 28 Palestinian firms listed in 2009. They 
measure performance by the change in return on investment between year 
2008 and the average return of the next 6 years. However, these papers can 
be criticized on the basis of measurement of variables, estimation methods, 
and sample size. Hassan et al. (2016) explored the relationship between 
corporate performance and corporate governance at Palestine Exchange 
7
Abdeljawad and Masri: Board Characteristics and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Pa
Published by Arab Journals Platform, 2020
ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  752 "Board Characteristics and Corporate Performance:  .....” 
An - Najah Univ. J. Res. (Humanities). Vol. 34(4), 2020 ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  
during the period from 2010-2012 using a sample of 30 non-financial 
firms. Accounting and market performance measures, namely ROA, ROE, 
and Tobin’s Q were used to proxy corporate performance. Corporate 
governance represented by the board of directors' size, the frequency of 
the annual meetings of the board, existence of an audit committee, 
institutional investors’ ownership and foreign ownership. They found that 
corporate governance variables are negatively associated with the financial 
performance which is in the contrary to the main stream literature. 
Hypotheses development 
The board effectiveness stays hard to understand and define. Empirical 
research highlights several factors that determine the degree the board 
would be effective in performing its duties and tasks. These factors are 
made up of particular board characteristics like CEO duality, board size, 
board diversity, board skills, board independence and frequency of board 
meetings. Following are discussions of these factors. 
CEO Duality 
The CEO duality can be considered as a control structure that 
combines the position of board chair and CEO. CEO duality can prevent 
board’s ability to keep track of management and weaken board monitoring 
effectiveness (Fama & Jensen, 1983), meaning that agency problems are 
higher when the same person occupies the two positions. According to this 
view, the separation of board chair and CEO positions can improve firm 
performance. Whereas the stewardship theory argues that when the same 
person implements both roles this may improve the firm’s performance, as 
internal and external ambiguity concerning the responsibility for firm 
objectives and processes may be removed (Finkelstein & D’Alene, 1994). 
Many empirical studies in emerging and less developed economies found 
that CEO duality may promote firm performance (Peng et al., 2007). Other 
studies found no significant difference between firms that separate 
between board and management and those with CEO duality (Daily & 
Dalton, 1997). In view of this discussion, the following hypothesis will be 
articulated. 
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H1: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. 
Board Size 
The board size is used as an indicator of both advisory and monitoring 
roles (Klein, 1998). The board size increases with firm size and firm age 
(Coles et al., 2008). Research on optimal board size led to no definite 
results. Large board size increases cost, as the coordination, 
communication, and efficient and effective decision making is costlier and 
harder, while small board size do not monitor managers effectively and 
can be directed by CEO.  
Many studies investigate the board size effect on performance. 
Yermack (1996) investigate the association between board size and firm 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q and found significant negative 
relationship. This research reveals that firms with small board are more 
capable to use their assets effectively and have higher profits than large 
board firms. Eisenberg et al. (1998) find a similar negative relationship 
between board size and firm performance as measured by return on assets. 
We will hypothesize the following 
H2: Board size is negatively related to firm performance. 
Board Independence 
The board may comprise executive and non-executive members. The 
non-executive directors play a vital role in monitoring the actions of the 
CEO and executive directors to ensure that the shareholders’ interests are 
well cared for and to add to the diversity of skills and expertise of the 
directors (Weir & Laing, 2001). Consistent with this argument, Awan 
(2012) found a positive relationship between non-executives and firm 
performance measured by return on asset (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) in Pakistan. Dehaene, Vuyst, and Ooghe (2001) found similar 
relationship in Belgian companies which supports the notion that outsiders 
are able to perform a monitoring function as a result of their independence. 
Some studies expect a contrary result. Weir and Liang (2001) argued 
that non-executive directors are only employed on a part-time basis and 
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are therefore likely to have other work commitments, may lack the 
expertise necessary for understanding highly technical business issues and 
may have insufficient information when required to make key decisions. 
Some studies found no relationship between independence and 
performance. A study conducted by Abdullah (2004) in Malaysia found 
that there is no significant difference in performance between firms with 
independent boards and firms with non-independent boards. They explain 
that in many developing countries, the selection of the independent 
directors is not based on their expertise and qualifications but more for 
political reasons and personal connections to legitimate business activities 
and contracts. The latter two arguments are similar to the case of Palestine. 
Therefore, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a negative relationship between board independence and 
firm performance. 
Gender Diversity 
Traditionally boards are composed of only male members. The 
presence of female on board leads to gender diversity. Largely, diversity 
is expected to enhance organizational value and performance as it provides 
new perspectives and insights (Carter et al., 2003). The influence of board 
diversity, mostly gender diversity, on firm performance has been studied 
widely. Erhardt et al. (2003) found that the percentage of women on board 
positively connected with return on investment and return on assets 
(ROA). Carter et al. (2003) found that the relationship between Tobin’s Q 
and the proportion of women on the board was positive. The impact of 
female directors on firm performance of selected US firms tends to find 
that female board members assign more effort to monitoring (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). However, Shrader et al. (1997) did not find any significant 
relationship in a sample of top US firms, between percentage of women on 
board and financial performance. Bohren and Strom (2005) reported a 
significant negative relationship between the proportion of women on the 
board and Tobin’s Q of Norwegian firms. Our hypothesis is the following: 
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H4: The percentage of women on firm’s board is positively related to 
firm performance. 
Academic background 
Board of directors constitutes an important resource for the 
corporation. Consequently, higher degree of educational credential like 
PhD will represent an additional wealth to the firm (Carpenter & Westphal, 
2001). Since many PhD holders are from academia, Francis, Hasan and 
Wu (2015) find that firms with directors from academia are associated with 
higher performance. In Francis et al., study, the presence of academic 
directors is associated with higher number of patents and citations, higher 
stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower chief 
executive officer (CEO) compensation, and higher CEO forced turnover‐
performance sensitivity. Overall, academic directors are valuable advisors 
and effective monitors and firms are expected to benefit from having them 
on board. The hypothesis related to board academic background is the 
following: 
H5: The percentage of directors with PhD qualifications and firm 
Performance are positively associated. 
Board Meetings 
Board meetings are an important channel through which directors 
obtain firm specific information and able to fulfill their monitoring role 
(Adam & Ferreira, 2009). Francis et al. (2012) found that firms with poor 
board attendance at meetings perform lower than boards which have good 
attendance during financial crisis. Ntim and Osei (2011) in South Africa 
found that boards that meet more frequently tend to generate higher 
financial performance.  
On the other hand, some researchers argue that board meetings not 
necessarily useful since frequent meetings involve managerial time, 
increase travel expenses, administrative support requirements, and 
directors’ meeting fees. This may affect enterprise activities within the 
firm as resources are being channeled towards less productive activities 
(Evans, Evans & Loh, 2002). Our hypothesis is the following: 
11
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H6: The firm performance is expected to be enhanced by more frequent 
board meetings. 
Research methodology  
Data 
This study examined the impact of board characteristics on firm 
performance using balanced panel data from Palestinian listed firms. The 
sample for this research is composed of 141 firm-year observations from 
all available firms listed in the PSE during the years 2012 to 2014 subject 
to the availability of data. The data was manually collected from the 
audited annual reports published on the website of PSE. Table 1 presents 
the distribution of the data by year and by sector. 
Table (1): Sample of the study by sector and year 
Sector 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Banking and Financial Services Sector 7 7 7 21 
Industry Sector 13 13 13 39 
Insurance Sector 7 7 7 21 
Investment Sector 9 9 9 27 
Service Sector 11 11 11 33 
Total 47 47 47 141 
Variables measurement 
The independent variables for this study include CEO duality, board 
size, board independence, board gender, board academic background, and 
board meetings. All these variables are theoretically discussed in Section 
3. The measurement of these variables is presented in Table 2 along with 
control and dependent variables which are discussed following.  
Corporate Performance 
Accounting performance measurement is used in this research since 
capital market in Palestine is not developed and tends to be volatile for 
reasons other than economic performance. Financial measures such as 
return on equity (ROE), return on asset (ROA) and earning per share (EPS) 
provide the direct and relevant focus for improving performance, since 
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measuring and rewarding activities that enhance financial performance is 
thought to best improve shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, this research 
employs the ROE, EPS and ROA as indicators of management 
performance. According to agency theory, managers may waste or 
misspend profits and earnings, and leave less return for shareholders hence 
lower ROE and EPS while return on asset (ROA) is directly related to 
management’s ability to use assets efficiently. 
Firm Size 
Large firms have more potential and capacity to generate funds, avoid 
financial constraints, and provide financing for profitable projects 
(Majumdar, 1997). We expect a positive relationship between firm size 
and firm performance. 
Leverage 
Leverage may proxy for financial distress hence a negative 
relationship is expected with performance. However, levered firms may 
have an additional incentive to generate higher level of cash flows to pay 
interest and principal to creditors hence positively relate to performance. 
We will use leverage as one of the control variables following Short and 
Keasey (1999); Abor (2005); and Bhagat and Bolton (2008). 
Table (2): Measurement of variables. 
Variable Abbreviation Measurement 
1. Board characteristics (independent variables) 
CEO duality Duality Dummy variable takes value of 1 if 
the CEO is a board chair, otherwise 0. 
Board size B Size Number of directors on board. 
Board 
independence 












B Meetings Number of board meetings held 
during the year 
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… continue table (2) 
Variable Abbreviation Measurement 
2. Firm performance (dependent variable proxies) 
Return on 
Equity 
ROE Net income divided by total equity 
Return on 
Assets 
ROA Net income divided by total assets. 
Earnings per 
Share 
EPS Net Income divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. 
3. Control variables 
Firm size F Size Logarithm of the firm’s total assets in 
US Dollars (firms data in Jordan 
Dinar is converted in USD using the 
official average exchange rate) 
Firm 
leverage 
Leverage Percentage of total liability to total 
assets 
Model 
The independent variables of this research include CEO duality, board 
size, board independence, board gender, academic background and board 
meetings. Moreover, firm size and firm leverage are used as control 
variables. The dependent variable of performance was proxied by three 
alternatives ROE, ROA and EPS. Based on our hypotheses, we proposed 
the following linear model to be estimated. 
Performanceit = B0 + B1 (Duality)it + B2 (B Size)it + B3 
(Independence)it + B4 (Gender)it + B5 (Academic)it + B6 (B meetings)it + 
B7 (F Size)it + B8 (Leverage)it + eit 
where performance is the dependent variable, Bis are the regression 
coefficients, independent and control variables within brackets are as 
discussed in Table 2, eit is the error term and i and t subscripts are firm and 
year indicators. The model has been estimated using Generalized Least 
Square method (GLS) to account for heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation problems appeared in the diagnostic process. 
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive analysis for the dependent and independent variables of 
the research are presented in Table 3. For CEO duality, in 81% of the firms, 
the CEO and Chairman positions are held by different individuals. Only 
19% of the sample firms have a dual leadership structure. The average 
board size of firms in Palestine is about 9 members ranging from 5 to 15 
members. Concerning board independence, the average percentage of 
independent members is 92%. Most board members do not have any 
position in the firm. 
The average percentage of women board membership is 5% of board 
size while the median is almost zero. This result is disturbing when 
compared to the increasing number of women participating on firm boards 
of other developed and developing economies. Concerning the percentage 
of PhD holders on board of Palestinian firms, the results indicate that the 
average number of PhD holders on corporate board is 15 percent of board 
size. This result is eye-catching considering the competences, capabilities 
and qualifications of the board. The average number of meetings is about 
6 meetings per year. However, the data of this variable is missing for a 
considerable number of firms. For this reason, we will estimate our models 
twice, one with board meeting variable and the other without this variable. 
The average ROE, ROA and EPS are 1%, 1% and 0.11 Dollars 
respectively. However, the median which is not affected by extreme values 
is 2%, 4% and 0.06 Dollars respectively. 
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Table (3): Descriptive statistics for all variables 
 
Correlation analysis 
Table 4 represents the correlation matrix between independent 
variables. Most of the correlation coefficients are relatively small 
indicating no serious multicollinearity problem existing between 
independent variables. Firm size has high positive correlations with 
leverage (54%) and board size (46%). However, these correlations do not 
indicate multicollinearity problem according to Asteriou and Hall (2007). 
Table (4): Correlation Matrix between independent variables 
 
Model Estimation 
This section presents the results of the model estimation. The model is 
estimated for the three proxies of performance ROE, ROA and EPS 
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separately. For robustness, two specifications with each performance 
proxy are considered, one with the board meeting variable and the other 
without the board meeting variable. Board meetings variable subjects to 
many missing observations and including it in the regression will result in 
high loss in information. Of course, the findings of the relationships 
between variables are more reliable if they are qualitatively equivalent 
between the two specifications with each dependent variable. Whenever 
the results of the two specifications are not the same, we consider the 
model with more observations to be more robust. Table (5) presents the 
regression results. F-statistics are significant for all models and R-square 
ranges from 40% to 67%. 
CEO duality and ROE are positively related consistent with our 
hypothesis. The coefficient of the duality variable was positive and 
significant in promoting the financial performance of firms in Palestine 
according to Model 1 consistent with stewardship theory and with the 
findings of many research papers that firms with CEO duality outperform 
firms that separate the two positions (Peng et al., 2007). Positive 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance may be explained 
by the fact that when the chairman is the same person as the CEO, 
decisions are executed faster. Moreover, the chairman (CEO) will be more 
aware of the decisions needed to be taken to improve performance and 
reducing the ambiguity of the processes and the objectives of the firm. 
However, the relationship with EPS is negative in Model 4 consistent with 
the agency theory which posits that the separation of the CEO and the 
chairman positions will enhance firm performance and monitoring 
effectiveness. The relationship is insignificant for other models. Overall, 
the evidence related to CEO duality is not conclusive. 
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Table (5): Estimation results for ROE, EPS and ROA as the dependent 
variables. 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Numbers in 
parenthesis are t-statistics. Panel EGLS estimation with cross section weights is used for 
the estimation of the following model 
 Performanceit = B0 +B1 (Duality)it + B2 (B Size)it + B3 (Independence)it + B4 
(Gender)it + B5(Academic)it + B6(B meetings)it +B7(F Size)it +B8(Leverage)it + eit 
For board size, the coefficient is negative and significant for all models 
with ROE and EPS. Large size boards have a negative effect on 
performance. Large board size seems to increase cost of coordination, 
communication, and reduces efficiency of decision making. This result is 
similar to Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) and is consistent 
with stewardship theory and also resource based theory. 
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The coefficient of board independence is negative with all 
performance proxies but becomes insignificant once the regression lose 
observation as a result of including board meetings variable. External 
board members may lack knowledge, information, or time for controlling 
and decision making (Weir & Laing, 2001). Therefore, the involvement of 
independent directors has a negative effect on performance consistent with 
stewardship theory. 
Surprisingly, a positive and robust relationship between the percentage 
of women on board and firm performance is found. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009); Carter et al. (2003); and 
Bonn (2004). This result is explained by diversity that enhances 
organizational value and performance as it provides new perspectives and 
insights to the firm as expected by the stewardship theory and resource-
based theory. 
Though we expect a positive relationship between the number of 
directors with PhD qualification and firm performance, the regression 
results show a negative effect for this variable on corporate performance 
for all models though vary with significance. This result is confusing since 
it is inconsistent with any existing theory. We may explain this result as 
PhD holders are invited to boards for prestigious reasons and they usually 
accept this role. The real power remains in the hands of the block 
stockholders who are mostly family members or group of investors. In this 
scenario, the existence of PhD holders becomes a burden not an asset for 
the firm governance and performance. 
The effect of the frequency of board meetings is positive indicating 
the more frequent the board met, the higher the performance of the firm. 
Board members are likely to obtain more information about the firm and 
fulfill their monitoring role via the board meetings. This result is similar 
to Adams and Ferreira (2009); Francis et al. (2012); and Ntim and Osei 
(2011). 
Firm size and leverage were used to control the relationship between 
board characteristics and firm performance. A positive and robust 
relationship was found between firm size and performance. The positive 
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relationship with size is consistent with the literature as larger firms are 
likely to improve corporate performance since economies of scale and 
scope are more emphasized, and knowledge and experience are enhanced 
(Majumdar, 1997). The negative and robust relationship found between 
leverage and firm performance is consistent with the proposition that 
leverage proxy for financial distress. This result is consistent with the 
results of Short and Keasey (1999); Abor (2005); and Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008). 
Conclusion 
Board of directors is the essential corporate governance tool. Boards 
are responsible for the corporation they rule. Consequently, corporate 
governance codes, regulations and recommendations are concentrating on 
enhancing the board’s effectiveness in order to increase corporate 
governance. In spite of the fact that boards of directors are assumed to be 
vital for the success and survival of firms, there is still quite little known 
about the way boards function in the small economy of Palestine. Board 
characteristics research has been influenced by agency theory, resource 
dependency theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory. This study 
investigated the effect of board characteristics of Palestinian firms on firm 
performance using panel data manually collected from the annual reports 
of all firms listed at the stock exchange from 2012 to 2014. 
The results indicate that corporate performance of Palestinian listed 
firms is negatively related to board size, board independence and board 
academic background. However, a highly significant positive relationship 
between performance from one side and gender diversity and frequency of 
board meetings from the other are found. The relationship between board 
duality and firm performance is inconclusive but the positive effect is more 
reliable since it is based on larger sample. The positive relationship is 
consistent with the fact that when the chairman is the same person as the 
CEO decisions are executed faster, the ambiguity between the processes 
and the objectives of the firm is reduced and performance is enhanced.  
The overall results are consistent with the stewardship theory. This 
may result from the ownership structure of firms in Palestine. Block 
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stockholders in Palestine are usually group of investors or family members 
who assign one of the family or the group as a CEO and support him to 
achieve the goals of the family or the group. The role of board is supporting 
rather than controlling the executives in this framework. 
This finding implies that in any future governance code, the 
stewardship theory not the agency theory should guide the lawmakers or 
legislators. Code governance in Palestine should not discourage CEO 
duality. On the other hand, the code should encourage smaller board size, 
gender diversity and more frequent board meetings. Board independence 
and academic background should be dealt with carefully. Governance code 
and policies should establish a real independence instead of existing face 
independence (i.e. governance code may call for cumulative voting to 
reduce the power of block stockholders). In this case independent 
members, whether academic or not, will have the power to control and 
supervise.  
Finally, the positive and highly significant relationship between 
percentage of female on board and performance is an interesting result and 
needs further research to determine the reasons behind it in the Palestinian 
environment. Whether diversity of expertise is the reason or there are other 
reasons is an open question left for future research.  
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